Driving through to nowhere
A soldier’s view of the Afghanistan war
By Garth Talbott
I’m beginning to feel the wear. This whole war just seems so pointless. I’ve come here with my eyes wide open, having done this before, and volunteered specifically for route clearance, but there is no sense of accomplishment, and the whole problem is systemic.
We clear routes, and the only clear part of the route is the section between the first truck and the last. Usually. Then the fourth truck back gets blown up. Well, at least that’s one less easily emplaced IED, and at least almost everyone in the truck is fine.
Then you run the same route back the next day and get blown up again. You start asking yourself what progress is being made. You can at least look at the short-term result, which is that usually you’ve saved the people behind you from getting hit, which really is a lot. Then you look at the long-term result, which is nothing.
They start putting pressure plates in, so we put $2.39 million mine rollers on the noses of the trucks. My first one lasted four hours. Then they offset the pressure plate, which costs them nothing except a few more feet of wire. Then we put big digger contraptions on the front of the mine rollers. We throw more and more money at the problems, and the adaptations to beat our money cost next to nothing.
The problem is that we have no real presence. We’re the dudes who drive by once in a while in our big-ass trucks. To the average Afghan, we’re no more than an occasional visitor, whereas the Taliban, whether welcome or not, are there, operating under our noses.
We provide nothing for the locals in the way of security. In fact, with our only occasional presence, we cause the problems. We’re the reason there are bombs in the roads through their villages.
What we need is not more equipment or facilities. We need to take the ridiculous amounts of money we’re spending here and put small units inside of every little town, not huge bases on the outskirts staffed almost entirely by support personnel. American and coalition soldiers need to be more like beat cops who know the town. They need to show the locals, through a constant presence, that they can be trusted.
Note Sgt. Talbott's words. Are we asking the Afghans to believe that we can defend them or that we can train some of their own villagers to defend them--from the Taliban--better than the Taliban can?We need to demonstrate by our actions that we can defend their way of life better than the Taliban by being present, and we can’t do that by just driving through, even if it’s every day. [my bolds]
Whatever our goals and methods should be now, it may be too late to enact them due to the mixed agendas we've espoused since we first got there and the utter confusion that's come of changing leadership at the top at this critical moment. And, if that's the case, then our goal needs to be to get the young men and women, many of whom have given long and miserable stretches of their lives to our totally FUBAR'd Middle East wars through back-to-back and/or extended deployments, out of there as safely as possible. I have no idea how.
There is supposed to be a critical, game-changing Kandahar offensive in process that makes it possible for COIN to succeed...right? We are supposed to be prepared for an increase in American fatalities as our troops attempt a modified clear-hold-build-and-transfer strategy used in Iraq to the very different conditions in this Taliban stronghold...I think. I'm not prepared for that, and I don't think I would be even if I understood what we're doing. The Marjah-style offensive seems to have morphed into Operation Hamkari (Operation Cooperation), where our troops try to displace the Taliban by forming a bond with local leaders.
The build-and-transfer chunk of the plan is dependent on arming and training local police and militia. That's a strategy that Karzai believes will result in armed challenges to the authority of the central government he's trying to build; he's putting his case to Petraeus in a series of meetings over the past week--a case that calls the entire plan into question. Between you and me, it sounds like a goat-rope. I have a sinking feeling that I'm watching the prelude to one of those last-helicopter-out-of-Vietnam moments.
What's your take?
How does one begin to recount the catastrophic miscalculations and blunders of the previous administration? Perhaps I should skip the detail and just focus on this: What kind of leader starts and mismanages two wars, lowers taxes, runs the economy into the ground, and then passes the calamity to the next president? The Bush/Cheney years have left us so bankrupt, we cannot keep pace with current commitments.
ReplyDeleteFrom what I understand, less than 10,000 of the 30,000 forces authorized by the President have been deployed to Afghanistan thus far. After two prolonged wars, our military has been overstretched for years. In addition, there have been other unforeseen circumstances, namely: 1 – A much slower than expected withdrawal from Iraq, and 2 – Troop commitments to Haiti after last year’s earthquake.
Sgt. Garth Talbot mirrors everything I heard during my daughter’s deployments to Iraq. In an asymmetrical war, a resourceful adversary can inflict heavy damage with cheap, improvised devices. No doubt, the Taliban have learned much from the Iraqi insurgents. Keeping small units inside every little town requires large numbers of troops. With less than 10,000 of 30,000 troops deployed thus far, there is a serious personnel shortage. Furthermore, rugged terrain favors a stealthy enemy.
The Afghan war is much more expensive and difficult to execute than the Iraq war. For instance, most supplies must be shipped overland through Pakistan, and our so-called Pakistani allies pilfer up to 50% of the containers (which arrive filled with rocks, not arms or supplies). A very maddening situation, all told.
I support our new president (I certainly worked hard to elect him), but I find it difficult to agree with his decision to surge the Afghan war. I prefer a complete withdrawal from both conflicts and a smaller, more humble military presence in the world.
So well said, Octo.
ReplyDeleteI have wondered if McChrystal was hearing the same worries from Karzai before he pulled out his sidearm and shot his career in the foot.
By declaring that the US strategy of build and transfer would guarantee an armed uprising against his government, Karzai has pronounced his country ungovernable. Apparently, he's working hard to put this argument to Petraeus.
Why on earth would we be willing to keep on betting that Karzai is wrong?
Nance, I forgot to mention ...
ReplyDeleteAbout those overland shipments through Pakistan, our government has requested that U.S. guards accompany those shipments to prevent looting, but the Pakistan government has refused our requests. The Pakistani looters are so adept at stealth, the containers arrive with no visible signs of entry ... all screws and hinges are skillfully removed, the contents emptied (with the same weight in rocks put in place), and the hardware reinstalled with not even a scratch.
In essence, our troops in Afghanistan are being held hostage by the Pakistanis. No, this has not been reported in the news. Consider this a Swash Zone news scoop.
Can it possibly get more impossible? Your scoop makes it obvious that there's something missing in the skill set we need for Afghanistan and Pakistan...and in the mindset. We're like big, over-protected babies stomping around in their world, clueless and careless. And squarely in harm's way.
ReplyDeleteThe only thing missing here in Sgt. Talbott's narrative is the torching of villages to deny Charlie access. Utterly depressing to me. We've been here before. Learned nothing.
ReplyDeleteWatched Errol Morris' 'Fog of War' the other day. A remarkable document. And recently read Robert McNamara's book 'In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam' (1995).
ReplyDeleteEleven lessons from the Vietnam War
1.) We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2.) We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3.) We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.
4.) Our judgments of friend and foe, alike, reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.
We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine.
5.) We failed, as well, to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
6.) We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement … before we initiated the action.
7.) After the action got under way, and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening, and why we were doing what we did.
8.) We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums.
9.) We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.
10.) We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
11.) We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions … At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.
Hmmm. The more things change...
It seems the powers that be gleaned two extremely unhelpful lessons from our past disaster.
1.) Control the message. Embedded reporters in military units first had to sign a contract restricting what they could report. Likewise as so many Americans (unfortunately) get their news from broadcast and cable journalists commanders are able to declare a 'blackout' as their own discretion for 'security' reasons. Embedded journalists can get too close to the action and its participants. Closeness can be good it also can (and did and does) hinder objectivity. The early days of the Iraq invasion had all the big time anchors dressed in fatigues and sunglasses playing soldier and cheering on the troops. This was not journalism's finest moment. And it explains the resentment toward Rolling Stone & the McChrystal story on the part of the more traditional stenographers who were instrumental in the run up to the war and the peddling of our 'success'.
2.) The All- Volunteer Armed forces. A profoundly anti-democratic move which in effect has removed the elite a draft would provide to the military. And it increases the inequitable burden of service borne by the economically disadvantaged and minorities. Which makes perfect sense for an imperial government which wages war as a matter of ongoing foreign policy.
I am blown away with Arthurstone's comment. Five stars!
ReplyDeletejadedj, I couldn't agree more. Arthurstone is brilliant, erudite, sarcastic and satirical with surgical precision, and often funny as hell ... and I hope the compliment goes to his head (hint, hint). What he says above in the context of the current wars would make a great post.
ReplyDeleteTo all,
ReplyDeleteI think what we're seeing is something akin to half-hearted imperialism (I'll leave intentions aside; my description refers only to procedures and approach)-- the Afghanistan campaign seems Quixotic to me because the opposing forces have been there for a long, long time and they know very well that we don't really want to be there. The Taliban are evil, but they're not incapable in military matters. They know exactly what they're about, while we don't seem to know quite what we're up to.
Our military people are very capable, but the mission may be asking them to do the impossible. I also don't get the sense that the American public is really following this war or at all committed to it, and that spells nothing good.
Politically, the whole thing is rapidly becoming a trap for the president: we can't really "win," but we also can't quite get out of there, either.
Arthurstone,
ReplyDeleteBrilliant, indeed.
And [7.) After the action got under way, and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening, and why we were doing what we did.] struck me as an issue our Commander in Chief has on numerous fronts right now.
Also, on The All-Volunteer Armed Forces, I wrote a more personal and emotional piece on this several months ago. When we're here in San Diego, a military town if there ever was one, we clearly see that it's the minorities and the underprivileged in our country who bear the greatest burden for our defense. And, of course, we wouldn't still be in Afghanistan if the draft system was still operative.